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Abstract 
This paper examines the determining factors of the audit committee independence in the financial sector of Bangladesh 
by employing a cross-sectional regression analysis on 72 financial firms. The paper reveals that firms with large boards 
and more non-executive directors tend to provide more independence to the auditors. Also, large firms with potential 
growth opportunities show less interest in giving freedom to the audit committee members; whereas firms with the 
higher leverage demand more audit committee independence to confirm quality monitoring and quality financial 
statements. The study, however, reveals a negative relationship between the size of the audit committee and its work 
independence. The study also does not find any significant association between audit committee independence and 
presence of experts in the audit committee, percentage of insider ownership, free cash flow, and firms‟ profitability. 
Keywords: audit committee, audit committee independence, financial sector, Bangladesh. 
1. Introduction 
Of late, the existence of an independent audit committee as a sub-committee of the board of directors to oversee the 
financial reporting and auditing process has received renewed interest in controlling frauds done by accountants and 
managers and improving the quality of the financial reports. An audit committee can be defined as a sub-committee of 
the executive board that is responsible for overseeing the quality and integrity of a firm‟s accounting and financial 
reporting system, internal control system, and compliance with relevant laws, rules, and regulations. As an operating 
committee of the executive board, audit committee can substantially ease agency problem by reducing informational 
asymmetries between insiders and outsiders, and parties interested in financial decision making. Besides, audit 
committee provides a connection between firm‟s management and external auditors. Moreover, audit committee tends 
to provide a positive signal about the firms‟ earnings quality and help improve the liquidity of stocks and 
stakeholders‟ confidence in financial reporting as well.  For instance, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991), Dechow et al. 
(1996), McMullen (1996), and Beasley et al. (2000) argue that audit committee can lessen practices of fraudulent 
financial reporting and help improve earnings quality, investment decisions, and lawsuits. DeZoort(1997), Abbott et 
al.(2004), and Mohiuddin (2012) argue that audit committee can, at a little or no cost to the auditor, improve internal 
control system of a firm and increase external auditor‟s independence by promoting communications with the board.  
Such enhanced communications reduce information asymmetries between management and the board, causing the 
quality of monitoring and reporting improve significantly. Furthermore, the existence of an audit committee helps 
companies to perform better in the financial markets, which, in turn, helps them to absorb new customers (Riasi and 
Pourmiri, 2015; 2016) and become more competitive in their business (Amiri Aghdaie et al., 2012; Riasi, 2015a, 2015b; 
Riasi and Amiri Aghdaie, 2012).   
Given the above, this paper studies the factors affecting the audit committee independence for firms in the financial 
sector of Bangladesh by using a multivariate cross-sectional regression model. The study takes Bangladesh as a case 
because Bangladesh shows impressive GDP growth rates (6% plus) over the last decade despite having anomalies in the 
stock market. The study targets financial sector because firms operating in this industry are subject to follow stringent 
regulations prescribed by Bangladesh Bank (the central bank of Bangladesh) on governance and formation of audit 
committee. Also, Bangladesh Bank frequently monitors financial sector companies to ensure compliance with the code 
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and imposes penalties to the company management for alleged cases of non-compliance. There is also a dearth of 
research papers that have dealt with the audit committee independence in Bangladesh thus far. For instance, Kamal and 
Ferdousi (2006) and Bhuiyan et al. (2007) analyzed the current regulations of audit committee in the banking system of 
Bangladesh. Das and Das (2007) also empirically examined disclosure of audit committee information by the listed 
companies of Bangladesh. In contrast, Hossain and Khan (2007) provided a comprehensive literature review of a fast 
growing theoretical and empirical literature on audit committee. However, till date no extensive research has been made 
to examine the contributing factors affecting the independence of the audit committee in the financial sector of 
Bangladesh. The current study fills this gap. 
The study detects that firms with a large board and more non-executive directors tend to provide more freedom to the 
audit committee. However, the freedom of the audit committee declines with the increase in firm‟s size. The study 
further unveils that the higher levered firms demand for more audit committee independence over the low levered firms. 
Besides, firms having potential growth opportunities are less likely to provide freedom to the audit committee. These 
findings are expected to benefit the managers, shareholders and policymakers such as Bangladesh Bank and the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in refining the governance system of the firms in the financial sector of 
Bangladesh. 
The rest of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 deliberates relevant theories and literature and formulates 
hypotheses of the study. Section 3 discusses research method. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes 
with some suggestions for future research. 
2. Theories, Empirics, and Hypotheses  
This study adopts the “agency theory” as a framework for testing the hypotheses it develops. The agency theory 
suggests that information asymmetry increases when there is a separation between management and the ownership of 
business. Multiple agency problems also exist when firms adopt more managers and become increasingly larger. In 
other words, agency problem ignites reduction in stockholders‟ wealth by creating “moral hazard” and “adverse 
selection”. Thus, firms adopt a set of laws and regulations, and design incentive structures to incentivize managers and 
to strengthen the quality of reporting systems or for that matter to mitigate the agency problem. Among other things, the 
existence of an audit committee as a sub-committee of the executive board, giving them enough autonomy to supervise 
the financial reporting and auditing process, is viewed as an effective tool in reducing information asymmetry and 
improving firm‟s financial reporting quality.  
In empirical works, a large body of literature also documents a positive connection between the existence of an audit 
committee and quality financial reporting of a firm. For example, Lin and Wang (2010), Dechow et al. (1996), and 
McMullen (1996) unveil that firms that have an independent audit committee are less likely to manipulate profits, more 
likely to disclose information voluntarily, and more likely to present quality financial reporting. Likewise, Garcia-Meca 
and Sanchez-Ballesta (2009) argue that independence of the audit committee can significantly improve quality and 
credibility of financial reporting. Cohen and Hanno (2000) further highlight that the existence of an independent audit 
committee significantly influences the risk assessment quality of the manager.     
The existence of an independent audit committee also provides a signal of a firm‟s commitment to good corporate 
governance (Sommer 1991). DeZoort (1997) notes that an independent audit committee acting as a governing body 
improves corporate governance practice in the firm. Collier (1996) investigates the performance of audit committees for 
firms in the UK and finds that audit committees with non-executive directors disclose more information voluntarily 
against others. Carcello et al. (2002) study factors associated with voluntary disclosure of audit committee charters and 
find that firms that disclose more audit committee activities have more freedom to the audit committee. Beasley (1996) 
notes that incidence of financial frauds largely deters the independence of the board of directors. Bedard et al. (2004) 
argue that objectivity in financial reporting process can be be ensured when audit committee has more independent 
members. Moreover, Abbott et al. (2004) claim that there is an inverse relationship between an entirely independent 
audit committee and the occurrence of the earnings restatement. Furthermore, Chan and Li (2008) note that firm‟s value 
and goodwill can be be significantly increased when independent directors are included in the audit committee. Notably, 
the primary duty of an audit committee is to protect stakeholders‟ interest, however, the quality of the auditing functions 
depends on the firm‟s working environment (DeAngelo, 1981). Thus, it is argued that audit committee should be free 
from management‟s intervention to ensure the interest of the shareholders (Mohiuddin, 2012). 
It is worth to note that the prime objective of forming an audit committee may be misleading if more insiders are 
included in the committee. Dechow et al. (1996) and Klein (2002) find that fraudulent financial activities of a firm are 
greatly reduced when independent members are appointed to the audit committee.  Gendron et al. (2004) note that 
members who are willing to be active and productive in the audit committee should have a probing attitude that helps 
them assess the management‟s different decisions. Collier (1996) argues that that audit committee can substantially 
reduce the number of external audits. However, it is hard to conclude that such committee can reduce audit fees. Similarly, 
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Turley and Zaman (2007), in a research of UK- based firms, conclude that audit committees to some extent influence the 
internal control system of a firm but they rarely discuss or challenge the audited reports. Klein (2002) and Carcello and 
Neal (2000) further argue that audit committees may underperform if adequate freedom is not given to them, meaning that 
they will seldom raise questions on the quality of financial reports. Recently, Al-Najjar (2011) finds that audit committees 
tend to be more independent when firms have large boards and more insider ownership. He also traces a negative 
connection with firm size and audit committee freedom which indicates reluctance of large firms to give freedom to the 
audit committee member. 
Menon and Williams (1994) note that outside directors‟ improve the effectiveness of an audit committee. Deli and Gillan 
(2000) find that firms‟ growth opportunities and managerial ownership inhibit audit committee independence although it 
does not do so with firms‟ size and leverage. Mendez and Garcia (2007) report evidence of a negative relationship 
between audit committee activity and leverage. Maria (2012) argues that board‟s characteristics and the size of audit firms 
largely influence independence, activity and specialization of audit committees. She also concludes that firms with more 
outsiders in the board favor independent audit committees to alleviate information asymmetry between outsiders and 
insiders, permitting effective control of management actions.  
For the effective functioning of an audit committee, the leadership (i.e. the chairmanship) is another important factor. In 
some firms, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) holds the chair position of the audit committee. This hampers not only 
freedom of the audit committee but also impedes to perform the assigned duties efficiently. Beasley and Salterio (2001) 
report that audit committees with more freedom are less likely to be associated with CEO duality. They also find a 
positive connection between non-employee directors and audit committee independence. Chan and Li (2008) note that 
audit committee independence is greatly hampered when CEO becomes the chair of an audit committee. This may also 
result in a substantial negative value for the firm. Recently, Husam et al. (2013) and Suyano (2012) reveal that 
reputation of audit firms, audit fees, availability of auditors, auditors‟ experience, and size of audit firms promote audit 
quality and freedom of the audit committee.  
Given the above discussion, this study classifies all the experimental variables that are likely to affect audit committee 
independence into four broad categories: firm-specific factors, characteristics of audit committee, board structure, and 
insider ownership (Fig 1). A brief discussion of all these factors and relevant hypotheses is outlined below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The four broad factors affecting audit committee independence 
2.1 Firm-specific Factors 
2.1.1 Firm Size 
Firm size is fundamental of many theories in auditing research, including the agency cost. Large firms can afford costs 
of stringent monitoring mechanisms, suggesting higher audit committee freedom (Klein, 2002). Large firms may also 
have greater internal control system over smaller firms (O‟Reilly, 1998). If a firm‟s internal control system performs the 
monitoring functions efficiently, which is often seen in large firms, then, it needs a lower level of audit committee 
independence (Klein, 2002). We take the above argument in account and infer that large firms require less or few 
alternative control mechanisms to ensure audit committee independence. This argument is consistent with Al-Najjar 
(2011). Our hypothesis regarding the firm size is: 
H1: Firm size negatively affects audit committee independence  
2.1.2 Financial Leverage 
Usually, creditors demand audit committee independence when they inject more debts to the firms. This is because 
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managers sometimes manipulate earnings to delay or avoid violation of debt contract. For example, Dechow et al. (1996) 
conclude that managers exaggerate earnings in the year before violations of debt covenants. This implies that as the 
firm‟s financial leverage increases, the creditors‟ demand for firms to monitoring the integrity of the financial reports 
increases, so does the demand for auditors‟ freedom. However, Al-Najjar (2011) reveals a significant negative 
relationship between financial leverage and audit committee independence, indicating that debt providers serve as an 
additional active monitoring agent in highly levered firms to control firms‟ opportunistic behavior and reduce the 
demand for audit committee independence. These confounding findings advocate us to draw the following hypothesis 
on financial leverage and audit committee freedom.  
H2: Financial leverage and audit committee independence is positively related.  
2.1.3 Growth Opportunities 
Firms with rapid growth may expose to mismanagement of earning and assets including the internal control system. 
Klein (2002) notes that growth firms can be exposed to greater uncertainties and intricacies in conducting business. So, 
they rely more on insider directors, not on non-executive or independent directors. He notes that managers and 
shareholders of high growth opportunity firms do not like to have an independent board and independent audit 
committee as well to control business complexities. This result supports the findings of Deli and Gillan (2000). Thus, 
we consider firms‟ growth opportunities as an important factor in determining audit committee independence. 
Consequently, our hypothesis regarding growth opportunities is: 
H3: Audit committee independence is negatively related to firm’s growth opportunities 
2.1.4 Free Cash Flow 
Free cash flow allows companies to pursue opportunities that enhance shareholder value. Boone et al. (2007) consider 
free cash flow as an index for managers‟ private benefit and argue that monitoring the quality of firm decreases when 
managers‟ private benefits are high. This implies that managers‟ with more private benefits are less likely to place a 
higher demand on audit committee freedom (Al-Najjar 2011). This argument supports the views of Jensen (1986) who 
advocates free cash flow reductions in mitigating agency conflicts. Al-Najjar (2011) also finds that free cash flow can 
promote agency conflicts, suggesting demand for more internal controls within the firm. Akin to the findings of 
Al-Najjar (2011), our hypothesis on free cash flow is: 
H4: Free cash flow positively influences the audit committee independence 
2.1.5 Profitability 
Th importance of profitability in providing audit committee independence has not been explored in the prior literature. 
Previous works demonstrate a link between audit committee independence and loss propensity of business. However, 
we believe that management of a firm may try to overstate profits of a firm to harvest personal gains, such as 
performance bonus. Thus, firms should put a strict internal control mechanism including the formation of an 
independent audit when there is a possibility of the private gain of insiders. Therefore, our hypothesis regarding firm‟s 
profitability is: 
H5: Audit committee independence is positively related to profitability of a firm 
2.2 The Characteristics of Audit Committee 
2.2.1 Audit Committee Size 
As effective monitors of corporate performance, audit committee members tend to face costly consequences such as 
loss of reputational capital if the entity‟s financial statements are manipulated and subsequently revealed by any groups 
(Raghunandan and Rama, 2007). This argument implies that a large audit committee performs better over a small audit 
committee to improving the quality of financial reporting. Besides, the inclusion of more non-executive directors in the 
audit committee can enrich decision-making quality of firms. Thus, our hypothesis regarding audit committee size is: 
H6: Audit committee independence is positively related to audit committee size 
2.2.2 Audit Committee Expertise 
The presence of an expert on the audit committee may ensure quality reporting of a firm. To this end, Abbott et al. 
(2004) document a significant negative relationship between the presence of a member of an audit committee with 
financial expertise and the incidence of financial statement restatements, meaning that inclusion of a financial expert in 
the audit committee improves quality monitoring and firm value. Logically, more experts in finance, accounting, and 
auditing as the members of audit committee may help improve the overall internal control mechanism of a firm and 
audit committee‟s independence as well. Thus, we include the financial expertise of audit committee members as a 
determinant of audit independence. Our hypothesis, in this regard, is: 
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H7: Expertise of audit committee members promotes audit committee freedom 
2.3 Board Structure 
2.3.1 Board Size 
A smaller board size improves monitoring by reducing free riders and makes it easier for the CEOs to control the board. 
However, the larger board of directors may be more valuable due to a wide range of knowledge and experience 
available. Additionally, Collier (1993) and Beasley and Salterio (2001) prove that firm‟s capability to hire more 
non-executive directors increases when board size increases. Arguably, organizations try to increase the number of 
directors on the board to choose quality audit committee members (Maria, 2012). On the same note, Klein (2002) 
indicates that large boards favor more non-executive directors in selecting members of audit committee to enhance 
quality financial reports. Consequently, our hypothesis on board size is: 
H8: Board size positive promotes audit committee independence  
2.3.2 Board Independence 
Non-executive directors are not a part of the executive team, but their community status and experience provide great 
exposure for the firm (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996). Similarly, Klein (2002) argues that the greater the number 
of non-executive directors on the board, the higher the chances of having more audit committee independence. Klein 
(2002) and Al-Najjar (2011) hypothesize a positive relationship between non-executive directors on board and audit 
committee independence. Besides, Raghunandan and Rama (2007) note that non-executive directors are more important 
over others in reflecting efficient corporate governance. Thus, our hypothesis regarding non-executive director is: 
H9: Audit committee independence is positively related to proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
2.4 Insider Ownership 
The impact of insider ownership is not much examined in the literature of audit committee independence. Al-Najjar 
(2011) argues that insider ownership can reduce agency conflicts. We believe that increase in insider ownership can 
efficiently perform monitoring activities of a firm, and so does its reporting quality. Hence, our hypothesis regarding 
insider ownership is:  
H10: Insider ownership positively influences audit committee freedom 
3. Research Methods 
This is an empirical research that aims at identifying determining factors of quality audits in the financial sector of 
Bangladesh. We applied both bivariate and multivariate analyzes to understanding the relationship between audit 
committee independence and other independent variables. We employed a cross-sectional regression method to test 
hypotheses of the study. Also, we checked multicollinearity problem among the variables by using variance inflation 
factor (VIF) to make our estimate robust.  
3.1 Sample Description and Data Collection 
We used a sample of 72 (seventy-two) listed companies from the financial sector of Bangladesh. The companies are 
listed on Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). In total, 99 (ninety-nine) firms are listed in the DSE under the financial sector. 
Out of these listed companies, 72 (72.73 percent) firms were selected using the simple random sampling technique. We 
collected annual reports of the sampled companies for the fiscal year 2012 and content analyze these reports extensively 
to gather information for the audit committee and other financial information. The population and sample are shown in 
Table 1: 
Table 1. Population and sample description of this study 
Financial Sector Population Sample Percentage 
Banks 30 30 100% 
Insurance Companies 46 32 69.57% 
Financial Institutions 23 10 43.48% 
Total 99 72 72.73% 
 
3.2 Variable Definition 
The dependent and independent variables are summarized in Table 2, including their definition and expected nature of 
their relationship with audit committee independence: 
 
Applied Finance and Accounting                                          Vol. 2, No. 2; 2016 
51 
 
Table 2. Description of the Research variables 
Variables Acronym Definition Expected Sign 
Dependent Variable    
Audit Committee 
Independence 
INDAUD Percentage of non-executive directors on 
audit committee. 
 
Independent Variables    
Audit Committee Size AUDSIZE Number of members of the audit 
committee. 
+ 
Board Size BOD Number of members of the board of 
directors. 
+ 
Board Independence INDEP Percentage of non-executive directors on 
the board. 
+ 
Insider Ownership INS Insider ownership is the number of shares 
held by directors and other company 
executives over the number of shares 
outstanding 
+ 
Financial Leverage LEV Total liabilities to total assets ratio + 
Earnings Per Share EPS Net profit after tax per share + 
Market to Book Ratio  MB Ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of equity 
- 
Free Cash Flow FCF Free cash flows per share + 
Market Capitalization SIZE Natural log of market capitalization that is 
equal to stock price at year end times the 
number of shares outstanding  
- 
Expert EXPERT 
 
Dummy variable that takes one if at least 
one member of audit committee is expert
1
 
and zero otherwise 
+ 
 
3.3 Regression Model 
We employ a cross-sectional regression model to understand the determinants of audit committee independence in 
Bangladesh. The regression model is as follows: 
 EPSLEVINSINDEPBODAUDSIZEINDAUD 654321   
)1(10987   EXPERTSIZEFCFMB  
Where:  
INDAUD = Percentage of non-executive directors on the audit committee  
AUDSIZE = Number of members of the audit committee 
BOD = Number of members of the board of directors 
INDEP = Percentage of non-executive directors on the board of directors 
INS = Insider ownership is measured by the number of shares held by the directors and company 
executives over the number of shares outstanding 
LEV = Total liabilities to total assets ratio 
EPS = Earnings per share measured by dividing the net profit after tax by the number 
of share outstanding 
MB = Market value of equity to book value of equity 
                                                        
1
 Consider expert if one has either academic or professional knowledge in accounting, auditing or finance. 
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FCF = Free cash flow per share 
SIZE = 
EXPERT = 
Firm size is measured by natural log of market capitalization 
Dummy variable that takes 1 if at least one member of audit committee is expert and zero, 
otherwise 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in the regression model of this 
study. This Table reveals that on average 27 percent of the members of the audit committees are made up of 
non-executive directors. Audit committees have an average of more than 4 (four) members while the board of directors 
has an average of 14 (fourteen) members. The presence of non-executive directors on boards is only 14 percent. 
Therefore, the percentage of non-executive director on the board is less than that of audit committee. Raghunandan and 
Rama (2007) suggest that the non-executive director on the board should be more than 50 percent to establish good 
corporate governance. From this point of view, the financial sector of Bangladesh is lagging behind the adequate 
number of non-executive directors essential for maintaining a proper balance on the board.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics  
Variables N Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
1st Quartile 3rd Quartile 
INDAUD 72 0.27 0.25 0.16 0.20 0.33 
INDEP 72 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.16 
BOD 72 13.79 14 3.90 11 17 
AUDSIZE 72 4.43 5 1.24 3 5 
LEV 72 0.66 0.74 0.29 0.40 0.91 
FCF 72 12.11 5.72 19.63 2.93 12.61 
INS 72 0.42 0.41 0.15 0.35 0.51 
MB 72 1.89 1.63 1.74 1.24 2.18 
SIZE 72 22.20 22.28 1.25 21.12 23.28 
EPS 72 2.43 2.01 1.81 1.465 2.84 
EXPERT 72 0.51 1 0.50 0 1 
 
On the other hand, firms‟ dependency on debt financing on average is 66 percent, implying that most of the firms in 
financial sectors depend more on its debt rather than on its equity to run its operations. The financial firms produce on 
an average of Tk.12 as free cash flow per share which is greater than the amount of earnings per share. It implies that 
financial sector firms are generating, on an average, more cash over their earnings per share. Also, growth opportunities 
(market to book ratio) and earnings per share have means of 1.89 and Tk. 2.43, respectively. Besides, corporate insiders 
hold almost 42 percent of outstanding shares. This significant amount of insider ownership may positively contribute to 
the enhancement of the overall internal control system of the firm and ensure good corporate governance. 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
The Pearson correlation coefficients are used for the correlation analysis between variables (Table 4). Accordingly, at a 
significance level of 1%, the correlation coefficients for INDAUD show a significant positive relationship with INDEP 
(+0.57) and significant negative association with AUDSIZE (-0.41). On the other hand, considering a 10% significance 
level, the correlation coefficient for INDAUD shows a significant negative correlation with MB (-0.20) and EXPERT 
(-0.21). Other insignificant correlation coefficients are LEV (+0.14), FCF (+0.11), INS (+0.06), SIZE (+0.01), BOD 
(-0.12) and EPS (-0.07). We also calculate variance inflation factor (VIF) to diagnose the existence of multicollinearity 
problem and find that variance inflation factors (VIF) values are less than 4 for all the independent variables, suggesting 
that multicollinearity not is a substantial issue in this analysis. Thus, we conclude that there is no multicollinearity 
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problem in our analysis after checking the result of both correlation matrix and variance inflation factor. 
Table 4. Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
Ordinary least square (OLS) multivariate regression analysis is conducted to examine the factors influencing the 
independence of audit committee. The results are presented in Table 5. The results reveal a significant and negative 
association between firm size and freedom of audit committee. This finding supports the view that large firms rely less 
on alternative control mechanisms because they can ensure more efficient internal control. The significant positive 
coefficient of financial leverage (LEV) suggests that creditors‟ demand higher audit committee independence possibly 
because they assume that managers could manipulate firm‟s earnings for the violation of debt contract. This argument is 
consistent with our hypothesis H2. We also find that a significant negative relationship exists between the firm‟s growth 
opportunities (MB) and audit committee independence. This result is supportive of the view that firms with high growth 
opportunities are likely to have less audit independence as they rely more on insider directors than on non-executive 
directors.  
Concerning the effect of audit committee size on the audit committee independence, we find a significant negative 
relationship between them, suggesting that the audit committee independence decreases as the size of audit committee 
increases. This result is contrary to our expectation. Al-Najjar (2011) also finds a negative but immaterial relationship 
between audit size and audit committee independence in his empirical study. To find out the reason, we checked the 
frequency distribution of non-executive directors in the audit committee. We find that most of the firms have only one 
or two non-executive directors on their audit committee indicating that the audit committee independence decreases as 
the number of members of audit committee increases.  
Furthermore, we find that coefficients of FCF, INS, EPS and EXPERT are not statistically significant at the 
conventional level. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypotheses for these variables with audit committee independence. In 
other words, firm‟s profitability, availability of free cash flows for distribution to shareholders, managerial ownership of 
stocks, and the presence of accounting and finance expert in the audit committee do not significantly influence the 
composition and independence of audit committee.  
Table 5. Results of Multivariate Regression 
Variable Expected sign Coefficient t-statistic P-value 
Intercept  0.911**    (0.354) 2.574 0.013 
INDEP + 1.004***   (0.175) 5.732 0.000 
BOD + 0.008*      (0.004) 1.988 0.051 
AUDSIZE + -0.045***    (0.011) -3.964 0.000 
LEV + 0.156*       (0.087) 1.794 0.078 
FCF + 0.000         (0.001) -0.343 0.733 
INS + 0.010        (0.094) 0.111 0.912 
MB - -0.015*         (0.009) -1.755 0.084 
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SIZE - -0.034*         (0.018) -1.863 0.067 
EPS +  0.004            (0.011) 0.326 0.745 
EXPERT + -0.025           (0.029) -0.871 0.387 
N=72 F-statistic 7.061 Prob. > F 0.000 R-square 0.54 Adj. R-square 0.46 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively 
5. Conclusions and Avenues for Future Research  
This paper has made an attempt to trace out the determinants of audit committee independence in the financial sector of 
Bangladesh. In doing so, we employed a cross-sectional data analysis technique for 72 financial firms in the year 2012. 
We find that audit committees are likely to be more independent when firms have large boards and more non-executive 
directors on the board. Also, we find that large firms with potential growth opportunity place less demand on audit 
committee independence. Besides, the highly levered firms need more monitoring mechanism to ensure audit 
committee independence. We also notice a negative association between the audit committee independence and the size 
of the audit committee. However, we did not find any evidence of the presence of an expert in the audit committee, the 
percentage of insider ownership, free cash flows, and profitability with the audit committee independence.  
In this paper, we investigated a single attribute of audit committee namely the independence of the audit committee. We 
kept our focus mainly to the determinants of the independence of audit committee without making any attempt to 
examine their consequences. The independent audit committee signals a firm‟s commitment to good corporate 
governance. The freedom of audit committee is also a prerequisite for protecting shareholders‟ right and increasing their 
wealth. Therefore, future research may be directed to examine empirically other attributes of the audit committee that 
help augment stockholders‟ wealth. Another avenue for future research could be investigating the impact of audit 
committee independence on due diligence or increase of credibility in the financial reporting process.  
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